The basic idea behind this distinction is derived from Frege. In the present thesis I try to show that proper names, being a distinctive class of expressions in natural language, have both reference – an object we use them to designate, or their bearer – and sense, i.e. Third, since Millianism has it that proper names express contents by way of designating objects, it is argued that they have to designate something in both kinds of possible world as well. Second, it is argued that these contents can be properly expressed by English proper names in both kinds of possible world. First, it is argued that the contents of proper names must be available not just in possible worlds in which the named objects exist, but also in possible worlds in which they fail to exist. This paper purports to show otherwise, namely that proper names have to be construed as designating something also in such possible worlds, which makes them obstinately rigid. In particular, if an object that is a Millian content of a name does not exist in a possible world in which the name is assigned an extension, it does not designate anything in that world. A recent argument suggested that proper names, though understood in the Millian fashion, are better viewed as merely persistently rigid. This paper defends the claim that proper names are obstinately rigid designators.
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